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chapter two
ecoNoMIc aNthropoLoGY
Before examining the biblical texts through the lens of Karl polanyi’s 
paradigm of exchange, a review of the intellectual history of economic 
anthropology before the publication of The Great Transformation (1944) 
will help contextualize his methodological framework.1 Specifically, an 
awareness of two aspects of his theoretical development can facilitate its 
application to ancient Israel. First, polanyi represents a seminal point in 
the midst of a long intellectual dialogue about political economy that goes 
back to adam Smith. For over two centuries, this debate has been so spir-
ited and intertwined that each scholar stands entangled with all of his or 
her opponents, supporters and revisionists. Simply stated, one can hardly 
understand weber, without also understanding ricardo, Mill, Marx and 
so forth. Second, many of the key figures throughout the development of 
economic theory, including polanyi, did not develop their theories with 
any intent to explain the economies of antiquity. For polanyi, the politi-
cal climate of the eastern european fascism motivated him to explore the 
connections between political systems and their economic activities. his 
earlier theories had a clear agenda in that he wanted to understand the 
trajectory of history that led to the present state of hungary and the rest 
of europe. polanyi sought to apply his theories to the ancient world as a 
mere validation for the universality of his model. a more thorough review 
of the development of economic anthropology can highlight both of these 
aspects, and ultimately help to nuance the application of polanyi’s para-
digm to ancient Israel.
Understanding the intellectual history will also help to evoke a con-
sciousness of a heuristic model, in that polanyi’s paradigm only serves to 
illuminate a particular culture. as with all social scientific applications 
to biblical studies, the model provides a framework, with an assumption 
that other cultures may indeed offer insight to the biblical era. But these 
social scientific approaches still remain models and nothing more. they 
function as abstract constructs, which allow scholars to contextualize 
1 Karl polanyi, The Great Transformation.
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interpretations. with the paucity of data from antiquity, scholars cannot 
subject these models to the rigorous empirical testing as modern eco-
nomic theory requires. consequently, the use of polanyi’s paradigm can 
serve as a methodological control, but without any intention to develop-
ing a singular consensus application for ancient economies. In order to 
utilize polanyi’s paradigm of exchange, this chapter examines this model 
in the context of the intellectual history of economic anthropology. 
2.1. Theories of Political Economy
2.1.a. Classical Political Economy
a look at the intellectual history behind the development of polanyi’s sub-
stantivist theory must begin with a brief review of classical political econ-
omy, which symbolically begins with the publication of adam Smith’s An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776.2 this 
treatise promotes a central theme that a free market can self-regulate by 
making sound decisions on allocation of production, consumption and 
distribution based on collective supply-and-demand. according to Smith, 
these forces make a much greater contribution to civilized society than 
any political institution. Because such a free market effectively determines 
distribution through profit maximization, Smith saw that individual self-
ish interests lead to the common good. Such a position was counterin-
tuitive in eighteenth century england, which considered private gain as 
antisocial by nature. to contest such sentiment, Smith famously argued, 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from regard to their own interest.”3 By pursu-
ing private interests, each of these craftsmen harmonizes their individual 
2 the actual birth of political economy is often attributed to cantillon, Quesnay or 
turgot, though none of these authors had the magnitude of Smith’s treatise; adam Smith, 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 
1937). the neglect of economic studies by biblical scholars is especially ironic when one 
reads the text and subtext of Smith’s hugely influential work and its profoundly religious 
overtones. the title, “wealth of Nations,” likely comes from the Isa 61:6; 66:12. the concept 
of the “Invisible hand” fits closely with the idea of a deity. Smith’s own religious views 
are unknown, though he likely had a protestant upbringing; see peter Minowitz, Profits, 
Priests and Princes: Adam Smith’s Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion 
(Stanford: Stanford University press, 1993); Jacob Viner, “adam Smith and Laissez Faire,” 
in The Long View and the Short: Studies in Economic Theory and Policy (Glencoe: Free press, 
1958), 213–245.
3 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I, 82.
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desires to a common benefit. this intrinsic quality of free economy to 
self-regulate is so astonishingly efficient and hidden, that Smith famously 
described an “invisible hand,” guiding the economic decision-making for 
the collective benefit.4
In recognizing the benefits of such individual desires, Smith described 
a primary distinction of classical political economy: the division of econ-
omy from the political sphere. For Smith, nonpolitical life needs to orga-
nize and sustain itself independently of political decision-making. thus 
economic laws must restrain the politicians, whom Smith disparagingly 
regarded as “crafty.”5 In turn, these politicians need to restrict themselves 
to caretaker roles that preserve access to economic freedoms, particu-
larly maintenance of property rights, national defense and certain public 
works. But Smith wanted to privatize even these common projects when-
ever possible. For example, Smith advocated for toll fares to fund public 
highways and bridges. Left to themselves, the laws of supply-and-demand 
naturally bring self-regulation to an economy with access and informa-
tion, ultimately working for the common good. 
Scholars quickly realized that such growth could not grow unchecked. 
Demographic issues confronted the optimism of the Wealth of Nations, 
beginning with thomas Malthus’ theory of population growth and its 
dependence on a limited food supply.6 David ricardo’s theory of rent 
elaborates on the theoretical foundation of Malthusian population con-
trol through his influential “corn model.” ricardo argued that economic 
growth inevitably sputters at some point due to the fixed quantity of natu-
ral resources.7 Specifically, when an agricultural society expands, the real 
rents on the prime land increase in proportion to the addition of lower 
quality land to meet production demand. with higher real rents, prof-
its from wheat decline. ricardo’s theory of rent intends to show that the 
landlord’s gain is counterproductive to capitalist interests to the point of 
equilibrium, when the incremental increase of rent is greater than the 
price of corn and production can no longer expand. In more general 
terms, when the quantity of a production factor (labor) increases, while 
4 Interestingly, Smith only uses the emblematic term “invisible hand,” only once in the 
entire treatise; Smith, The Wealth of Nations, IV, 477.
5 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, IV, 435.
6 thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London: J. Johnson, 1798).
7 David ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John 
Murray, 1817).
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the other factors remain fixed (land), marginal productivity declines.8 
whereas ricardo admittedly assumed a fixed wage for his models, more 
recent economists have formulated a ricardian growth model with vari-
able-wage assumptions.9 within such a model, the wage rate increases 
until it equals the natural rate, that is, when the marginal cost of produc-
tion equals the required wage labor for such production.
aside from the theory of rent, ricardo formulated the Law of compara-
tive costs. Using the simplistic example of a two-nation (england and por-
tugal), two-commodity economy (cloth and wine), ricardo demonstrated 
that marginal advantages in production (rather than absolute advantages) 
provide an incentive for the countries to trade. although seemingly obvi-
ous to today’s economist, one must remember that ricardo was the first 
to advocate for a theory of international trade against a theory of intra-
national trade based on relative immobility of capital between polities. 
this was a crucial point in that absolute advantage has limits, whereas 
marginal advantage is ubiquitous within all macroeconomic structures.10 
ricardo’s theories of comparative costs convincingly demonstrates 
the benefits of international divisions of production, and his successor, 
John Stuart Mill, outlined the mechanism of price determination of such 
a system.11 Specifically, Mill determined formulas to quantify the relative 
8 For more detailed exposition on ricardo’s corn model, see Mark Blaug, Economic 
Theory in Retrospect (cambridge: cambridge University press, 1997), 30–34; takuo Dome, 
History of Economic Theory (Brookfield, Vt.: edward elgar, 1994), 85–106.
9 John hicks and Samuel hollander, “Mr. ricardo and the Moderns,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 91 (1977): 351–369; carlo casarosa, “the New View of the ricardian theory 
of Distribution and economic Growth,” in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. M. Baranzini 
(oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 45–58; casarosa, “a New Formulation of the ricardian System,” 
Oxford Economic Papers 30 (1978): 38–63.
10 egyptologist David warburton draws on the issue of tin-importation in anatolia to 
affirm ricardo’s “theory of comparative advantage,” warburton, State and Economy in 
Ancient Egypt, 104. But warburton extrapolates too much from the limited data of anato-
lia. although they began to specialize, this does not definitely point to significant market 
presence. anatolia clearly had the resources to produce both silver and tin, during the 
second millennium bce, tin production ceased and anatolian polities began to import it. 
the hittites and hurrians chose to divert their energy to concentrate on silver production, 
where they held comparative advantage. Similar examples can arise from almost every 
periods of the Near east, such as the specialization of olive oil in seventh century ekron 
or the shipping industry of the phoenician city-states. therefore, although ricardo first 
elucidated this concept into a workable economic model, the intrinsic understanding of 
comparative advantage dates from antiquity. 
11 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Application to Social 
Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1848); this theory of rent openly disclosed 
a conflict between the landlord and the producer. Such a basis would later develop into a 
Marxist perspective on economies.
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prices of ricardo’s two-commodity world. this provided a computational 
model to determine the rate of benefit for countries in free trade. In such 
computations, Mill recognized certain situations of “imperfect specializa-
tion” in which one country does not necessarily benefit, but continues to 
trade based on mutual demand. In quantifying the price, Mill proved the 
possibility of one of the two countries not specializing in production, or 
imperfect specialization.
continued modifications to classical political economy spawned mul-
tiple theories from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. 
In the western world, the most lasting and influential of these theories 
are Neo-classical and Keynesian economics. Neo-classicism, associated 
with carl Menger and william Stanley Jevons, advances the primacy of 
marginality as a powerful conceptual tool alongside the classical measures 
of growth, distribution and labor theory of value.12 Most importantly, this 
period saw the development of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Util-
ity. with marginality at the forefront, Neo-classicism adds elements of 
human logic into the sterile parameters of material production. Keynesian 
economics also modified classical political economy by confronting the 
inevitable shortcomings of the market economy.13 with the empirical evi-
dence of the Great Depression, the Keynesian critique argues that inabil-
ity to make good decisions on production can lead to a systemic failure 
of the market system to assure adequate purchasing power. these failures 
necessitate government intervention designed to assure stable processes 
of production and employment.14 
although classical economic models have significantly developed since 
adam Smith, they essentially maintain the same hobbesian assumptions, 
that is, people make rational economic decisions based on profit mod-
els. even with the revisions of Neo-classicism and Keynesian econom-
ics, the core of homo economicus remained intact: (1) people act selfishly; 
(2) people inherently exchange for maximizing; (3) universal scarcities 
12 william Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (New York: MacMillan and 
co, 1871), carl Menger, Principles of Economics (auburn: Ludwig von Mises, 1871, 1976).
13 John M. Keynes actually used ancient egypt as an illustration for his notion of mul-
tiplier; John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. (London: 
Macmillan, 1936). recently, warburton tries to apply Keynesian economics to New King-
dom structures. Unfortunately, most economists do not consider Keynesian theory as valid 
for even the Depression era, much less any economy of antiquity; warburton, Macroeco-
nomics from the Beginning. 
14 For a succinct review of the precepts of Neo-classicism and Keynesian economics, 
see James a. caporaso, David p. Levine, Theories of Political Economy (cambridge: cam-
bridge University press, 1992), 79–125.
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of needs / wants drive economic decisions; (4) when people are rational 
(have knowledge), they maximize and strategize; and (5) the individual 
serves as the unit of analysis. these economic assumptions remain so fun-
damentally intrinsic to western thought that most historical treatments 
of antiquity make these assumptions, yet they rarely state them explic-
itly. In fact, the systematic defense of an adam Smith economy in the 
ancient Near east under the rubric of the “modernist” or “formalist” only 
began to appear in response to competing economic theories. although 
these formalist scholars vary in their use of corpora and time periods, they 
all essentially assess the maximization of profits as a universal charac-
ter of society. Many of these arguments base themselves on epigraphic 
evidence, assessing seemingly capitalistic activity such as interest-bearing 
loans, receipts and partnerships in ancient economics. chapter Five will 
explore these issues in greater detail, but for now, one must understand 
that the extant economic texts are not completely revealing of the greater 
system. Both market-exchange and administered-exchange can produce 
similar corpora. as a result, the issue of proper evaluation of such evi-
dence remains the primary challenge to the formalists. 
whereas classical political economy continues to dominate the west-
ern constructs of social order, other trajectories from adam Smith com-
pletely overturn his capitalist assumptions on economic life. Specifically, 
Karl Marx also recognized the separability of economics from political 
order, but he took the concept much farther, making economic activities 
the driving force behind societal progression.
2.1.b. Karl Marx
although Karl Marx died during the nascent beginnings of assyriology, 
his basic ideas on economy have been hugely influential in the field 
of ancient Near eastern studies. Marx reacted ambivalently to classi-
cal political economy. he viewed capitalism as a decisive stage within 
a grand progression, but a stage with ideological limits, which prevents 
further advancement. Specifically, Marx saw a capitalist system as non-
benevolent, even anarchic, as it inevitably leads to crises among produc-
ers. Marx interpreted a Darwinian struggle among capitalists in a drive to 
accumulate more and more surplus, until lesser capitalists struggle and 
even fade away. this distinction between the capitalists and the work-
ers progressively becomes more pronounced and thereby creates distinct 
classes. this class consciousness inevitably leads to conflict as indi-
viduals commit themselves to pursue collective interests (contra homo 
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economicus) thereby catalyzing major societal changes via “class struggle.” 
In Marx’s grand scheme, the progression of human evolution consists of 
five major stages: primitive-communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and com-
munist modes of production. each mode distinguishes itself by the access 
to these means of production, and the transfer between stages arises from 
internal dynamics.15 
this herein becomes the fundamental contribution of Marx to ancient 
Near eastern economies, the emphasis on the relations of production. 
For antiquity, the ownership of land is the primary means to production, 
and thus, access to land defined class structures. But in most periods and 
regions of the ancient Near east, one cannot easily identify such distinct 
classes. one can also question the idea of a pervasive class consciousness 
among the exploited that propelled any major societal change. histori-
cally, the ancient Near east (and Far east) went through vast periods of 
time without much progress along any grand dialectical continuum.
For these reasons, Marx and engels modify their theoretical application 
to the eastern world through their concept of the asiatic Mode of produc-
tion.16 In order to explain the lack of dialectical progression in oriental 
society, Marx and engels drew on the works of British political economists 
such as John Stuart Mill.17 they characterized the oriental world as des-
potic centralized states dominating over small peasant communities. Such 
a centralized state prevents individual property holdings thereby negating 
any accumulation of capital and concomitant progression along any Marx-
ist continuum. the central government coordinates large-scale irrigation 
projects and collects rents from the villages, leaving autarkic villages with 
little possibility for trade and surplus. economic autonomy makes these 
societies particularly vulnerable to stagnation. whereas european modes 
of production clearly followed a deliberate progression, eastern countries 
remained sluggish for long periods of time. Because Marx and engels 
15 For a review of the Marxist critique on classical political economy, see caporaso, 
Theories of Political Economy, 55–78; prabhat patnaik, “Notes on Marx’s critique of classi-
cal political economy,” Social Scientist 30 (2002): 59–67. 
16 For treatments on the development of the asiatic Mode of production within the 
Marxian corpus, see Stephen Dunn, The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production 
(London: routledge, 1982); Lawrence Krader, The Asiatic Mode of Production (Van Gorcum, 
1975), Brendan o’Leary, The Asiatic Mode of Production (oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
17 Brendan o’ Leary explains the connections between British political economy and 
the asiatic Mode in The Asiatic Mode of Production: Oriental Despotism, Historical Material-
ism and Indian History (oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 73.
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primarily theorized on european economies, they left the concept of the 
asiatic Mode largely undeveloped.
after the death of Marx, the discussions over the asiatic Mode of pro-
duction reached major impasse among both theorists and political figures. 
the political transitions within china and Japan further complicated the 
development of the asiatic Mode. Ironically, while chinese and Japa-
nese scholars began to seriously discuss the viability of the asiatic Mode, 
Soviet scholars aggressively discredited it.18 Sergei Dubrovskii saw feudal-
ism, rather than any asiatic Mode, as a more precise descriptor with the 
implicit hierarchy of suzerain and vassal.19 It may have had variations on 
medieval european feudalism, but it certainly was not distinguishable 
as a mode of production to itself.20 eastern european opponents turned 
to political arguments saying that the concept of an asiatic Mode could 
undermine the Soviet policy.21 Specifically, Stalin wanted to control chi-
nese movements, and needed a theoretical policy that would not be 
geographically distinct, and would justify alliance between him and the 
chinese Kuomintang. others turned to ideological arguments, claiming 
that supporters of the asiatic Mode distorted the writings of Marx and 
engels.22 Marxist historian Leszek Kolalowski identified three particu-
lar contradictions between the asiatic Mode and basic Marxist theory: 
(1) Marxism emphasizes production rather than geography; (2) Marxism 
highlights progress over stagnation; (3) Marxism sees this progress as uni-
versal and not limited to a western phenomena.23 the emphasis on the 
asiatic mode of feudalism moved to an emphasis on slavery. In a 1933 lec-
ture, V.V. Struve saw feudalism as a poor descriptor, and argued that most 
economies were driven by slave production.24 eventually, Stalin, himself, 
denounced the asiatic Mode in the 1930s so that by 1938, he did not 
18 Joshua Fogel, “the Debates over the asiatic Mode of production in Soviet russia, 
china, and Japan,” American Historical Review 93 (1988): 56–79.
19 Dunn, The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production, 60; Fogel, “the Debates over 
the asiatic Mode of production.”
20 this eventually viewpoint became quite influential particularly in studies of Ugaritic 
economies.
21 Dunn, The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production, 61, 75; Fogel, “the Debates 
over the asiatic Mode of production.”
22 Dunn, The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production, 18–30.
23 Leszek Kolalowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 3 vols., vol. 1 (oxford: oxford Univer-
sity press, 1978), 350.
24 Vasilii V. Struve, “the problem of the Genesis, Development and Disintegration of the 
Slave Societies in the ancient orient,” in Ancient Mesopotamia: Socio-Economic History, ed. 
Igor Diakonoff (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 17–69.
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recognize the existence of an asiatic mode among the five standard modes, 
effectively silencing the discussion. this viewpoint remained dominant 
until the death of Stalin in 1953. 
the succeeding years of de-Stalinization saw a revival of the concept 
of the asiatic Mode of production. For a brief time, it eventually evolved 
into a well-accepted theory during the 1960s largely as a result of Karl 
wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957).25 
though wittfogel originally served the German communist party, after 
his move to the United States, he supported a vociferous anti-Marxist pol-
icy, criticizing both the theoretical underpinnings of the asiatic mode, as 
well the totalitarianism of the Stalin regime.26 Both the Soviet Union and 
the people’s republic of china very much fell into such stagnation that 
inevitably resulted in absolute power over hydraulic resources. he hoped 
to find a valid analogy in ancient economies to theorize on the relation-
ship between power and control of irrigation, drawing on evidence from 
Mesopotamia. eventually, his theory fell out of favor due to the lack of 
hegelian progression in Mesopotamian irrigation history, but wittfogel 
at least rekindled the discussions of the asiatic Mode in the ancient Near 
east, particularly with the “Leningrad School.”27 
the “Leningrad School,” associated with Igor M. Diakonoff, Muhammed 
Dandamaev, Michael heltzer, and western advocates in Mario Liverani, 
carlos Zaccagnini and roland Boer, created a hybrid version of the asiatic 
Mode for application to the ancient Near east. these scholars espoused 
a “two-sector” model in that not all economic players were propertyless 
slaves, or feudal serfs. to a degree, Diakonoff aligned himself with Struuve 
in that he characterized the two-sector model as an early type of slave 
mode, contending for the presence of a substantial group of “free sector” 
outside of the official royal and temple state sector.28 In more explicit 
25 Karl wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New haven: 
Yale University press, 1957).
26 wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, 375–378.
27 the actual pattern of irrigation control fluctuates quite severely, with peaks during 
the beginning of the old Babylonian reign and again during the Sassanians from the third 
to seventh centuries ce; robert Mcc. adams, “Die rolle des Bewässergungsbodenbaus bei 
der entwicklung von Institutionen in der altmesopotamischen Gesellschaft,” in Produk-
tivkräfte und Gesellschaftsformationen in Vorkapitalistischer Zeit, eds. J. hermann and 
I. Sellnow (Berlin: akademie, 1982), 119–140. 
28 Diakonoff was reacting to the feudalism models for ancient Near eastern economic 
society. In line with Marxist grand historical progression, Diakonoff saw feudalism as a 
single stage in historical materialism. Igor Diakonoff, “the Structure of Near eastern Soci-
ety before the Middle of the Second Millennium B.c.,” Oikumene 3 (1982): 7–100.
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Marxian terms, the “non-free” sector did not own the means of production 
and essentially existed as a slave class, whereas the “free” sector owned 
some of the means of production and functioned as relatively indepen-
dent proprietors working their own ancestral lands. Diakonoff argued from 
his philological understanding of the native terms for the two classes in 
old Babylonian texts, as described in the ideological code of hammurapi: 
the “free” (mar awilu), and the “non-free” (mar mus�kenu). Various cunei-
form administrative texts list the former term as using patronyms and 
extending from larger kin-based familial units, whereas the latter term is 
typically listed by profession and comes from smaller households without 
social nets, thereby requiring state protection. Diakonoff relied heavily on 
Middle assyrian and Nuzi documents to describe the more specific struc-
tures of this free class whose land belonged to communal kin and not the 
state, though his interpretation has been heavily criticized.29 
Diakonoff ’s student, heltzer took much of the theoretical basis of the 
two-sector model and applied it directly to the Late Bronze age Northern 
Levant.30 heltzer interpreted the Ugaritic textual data as including the dis-
tinct group of rural communities of the kingdom, the free “sons of Ugarit” 
(bn ’ugrt) and and the non-free “royal servants” (‘bd mlk). the limited 
nature of the king is further highlighted by texts of royal land purchase 
suggesting the restriction of absolute land seizure. heltzer was one of the 
most prolific writers on Levantine economic systems and has brought 
attention to many of the crucial issues. For one, he was working against 
long held traditional understandings of ancient Near eastern rulers as des-
potic in every aspect, a characteristic clearly now rejected. But his works 
have been attacked on both his arbitrary selectivity of evidence, and lack 
of philological sophistication.31 essentially, the terminology in the Ugaritic 
29 Leemans protests the identification of a significant extended family and rural com-
munity unit in old Babylonia. w.F. Leemans, “the Family in the economic Life of the old 
Babylonian period,” Oikumene 5 (1986): 15–22; Leemans, “trouve-t-on des ‘communautés 
rurales’ dans l’ancienne Mésopotamie?,” in Les Communautés Rurales II: Antiquité (paris: 
Dessain et tolra, 1983), 43–106. J.N. postgate makes the same objection on the basis of Mid-
dle assyrian texts; J.N. postgate, “Ilku and Land tenure in the Middle assyrian Kingdom—
a Second attempt,” in Societies and Languages of the Ancient Near East: Studies in Honour 
of I.M. Diakonoff., ed. M.a. Dandamaev (warminster: aris and phillips, 1982), 304–313. 
30 Michael heltzer, The Internal Organization of the Kingdom of Ugarit (wiesbaden: 
Ludwig reichert, 1982), heltzer, Goods, Prices and the Organization of Trade in Ugarit 
(wiesbaden: reichert, 1975).
31 Michael astour, review of Michael heltzer, the rural community in ancient Ugarit, 
JNES 39 (1980): 163–167; Dennis pardee, “Ugaritic Studies at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury,” BASOR 320 (2000): 49–86; péter Vargyas, “Stratification Sociale À Ugarit,” in Society 
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administrative texts does not necessarily translate into rigid social classes 
as heltzer interprets.32 regarding land grants, although members of the 
royal family may purchase land, the language of these contracts is almost 
verbatim in any other type of transaction. David Schloen notes that in 
the entire corpus of texts from Ugarit, the king, himself, never makes a 
single land purchase.33 rather than such a two-class sector, Schloen sees 
that most of the households had worked for both their own kinship land, 
while also involved with labor devoted to the royal sector.34
Some western scholars have adopted basic precepts of the Leningrad 
school. although Diakonoff never explicitly used the term “asiatic Mode 
of production” likely due to the political climate of Stalin and the promo-
tion of Marxist orthodoxy, Zaccagnini specifically identifies the two-sector 
model of antiquity with the asiatic Mode.35 Liverani also utilizes the two-
sector model, attempting to incorporate hard data from the abundant eco-
nomic texts of Ugarit in regards to royal farms.36 he determines that the 
epigraphic evidence shows the king exploiting the peripheral agricultural 
communities, wreaking havoc in countryside production. Such unchecked 
redistribution eventually made the Levantine coast vulnerable to the Sea 
peoples’ attack, which signaled the end of the Bronze age. For a long 
time, the two-sector model was a chief paradigm for the Late Bronze age 
and Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1500–1000 B.C.), eds. Michael heltzer and 
edward Lipiński (Leuven: peeters, 1988), 111–123. 
32 For example, heltzer supports his two-sector model with a hittite royal edict (rS 
17.238) promises to extradite any Ugarit peoples among the ‘apiru. heltzer suggests that 
the juxtuposed terms “son of a servant of the king of Ugarit,” (Ir3 LUGaL kur u2-ga-ri-it) 
and “son of Ugarit,” (DUMU kur u2-ga-ri-it) suggest native terminology for the two-sectors. 
In contrast, Schloen argues that the hittite edict has little need to mention two classes, but 
rather acts to include everyone in Ugarit regardless of class. this wider understanding is 
more sensible in light of other written evidence of these phrases; see Schloen, The House 
of the Father, 221–222.
33 Schloen further argues that even if such a text existed, it would not necessarily reflect 
the limited royal power on the land, but rather a compensatory act of the king to the previ-
ous holders of that land. of course, such an assessment depends on the language and form 
of any such hypothetical document, though the biblical texts themselves would suggest 
limited royal power in regards to royal lands; Schloen, House of the Father, 230.
34 Schloen, House of the Father, 224.
35 carlos Zaccagnini, “asiatic Mode of production and ancient Near east: towards a 
Discussion,” in Production and Consumption in the Ancient Near East, ed. c. Zaccagnini 
(Budapest: University of Budapest, 1989), 1–126, though Dunn refutes this in The Fall and 
Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production, 35–36.
36 Mario Liverani, “economy of Ugaritic royal Farms,” in Production and Consump-
tion in the Ancient Near East, ed. c. Zaccagnini (Budapest: University of Budapest, 1989), 
127–168.
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Levant, largely out of default.37 Boer sees the asiatic Mode as useful not 
for its explanation of stagnation, but rather for its attention to the deeply 
complex and integrated understanding of economy.38 Boer highlights the 
multiple nodal centers of economy and declares that the sacred aspects of 
these centers allows for the activities of allocation and extraction.
currently, most applications of Marxist economic theory arise from 
Immanuel wallerstein, who suggests a world-system, in which resources 
from the periphery move to the centralized state.39 wallerstein argues that 
technological advance coupled with capitalism make supply-and-demand 
powerful forces to economic life. as these forces grow, they produce a 
division of labor that allows for continued exploitation, analogous to 
Marx’s dichotomy of exploited proletariat and the capitalist bourgeoisie. 
Market exchange, more than ideology or coercion, has the ability to main-
tain such exploitation. wallerstein emphasizes that this social dichotomy 
extends beyond local political borders, thus the model advocates a world-
system. wallerstein explains:
Note the hyphen in world-systems and its two subcategories, world- 
economies and world-empires. putting the hyphen was intended to under-
lines that we are talking not about systems, economies, empires of the 
(whole) world, but about systems, economies, empires that are a world (but 
37 For much of the 1970s and 1980s, the two-sector model was the only alternative to 
the theoretical approach of feudalism to the Late Bronze age Levant. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, several scholars saw medieval feudalism as a sensible weberian ideal type for 
Ugaritic society. these scholars quickly became enamored with this superimposition of a 
medieval feudal model over Late Bronze age Ugarit. See John Gray, “Feudalism in Ugarit 
and early Israel,” ZAW 64 (1952): 49–55; anson rainey, “the Social Stratification of Ugarit” 
(ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1962). cf. albrecht alt, Die Landnahme der Israeliten in 
Palästina (Leipzig: werkgemeinschaft, 1925). the maryannu “charioteers” as Indo-euro-
pean nobility seemed to provide a perfect analogy with european knights. these “chario-
teers” stood at the top of most profession lists, and tended to receive the greatest payments 
in distribution. the language of many of the vassal treaties had certain correlation to the 
contracts of feudal lords. Both medieval europe and the Bronze age appear to have a 
rather large class of propertyless workers, or “serfs.” the KTU 4 corpus often names people 
by skilled profession, somewhat akin to the guilds of feudalism. But this dependence on a 
weberian feudal ideal type was problematic. First, the vassals of Ugarit did not have the 
freedom of medieval europe. Second, the textual evidence of the Late Bronze age does not 
unambiguously support the presence of devoted guilds. third, the only true connection 
between the maryannu and the medieval knights were the horses. thus, the Marxist “two-
sector” model of the Leningrad School quickly replaced the ideal of feudalism.
38 roland Boer, “the Sacred economy of ancient ‘Israel’,” SJOT 21 (2007): 29–48.
39 Immanuel wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Ori-
gins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: academic press, 
1974).
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quite possibly, and indeed usually, not encompassing the entire globe) [ital-
ics, parenthetical expressions original].40 
technology catalyzes this world-system. By the late fifteenth century, 
europeans mastered the technology to ship bulk commodities over long 
distances. once this technology arrives, it transforms the social structure 
of the world, allowing for core-periphery exploitation without explicit 
political control. the technology of this world-system could then main-
tain such an exploitative relationship for extended periods.
although wallerstein initially denied that such a “world-system” applies 
to the pre-capitalist periods, this system has developed into an extremely 
popular paradigm for ancient Near eastern economies for its explicit 
integration of multiple aspects (political, economic, social, ideological) 
in defining the complexity of ancient societies.41 phil Kohl challenges the 
exclusivity of the world system to modern europe, and applies this system 
to the Bronze age periods with the major modification of multiple cores 
and a pre-capitalist setting.42 other ancient Near eastern scholars quickly 
followed and suggested a world-system paradigm with the prime modifi-
cation of its ability to maintain itself in the absence of capitalist systems.43 
wallerstein eventually recognized the flexibility of his own model and its 
potential as an analytical model for pre-capitalist periods.44
 But historical evidence suggests that the world systems paradigm is 
either inapplicable to the ancient Near east, or it requires so much modi-
fication that it loses any merit as a theoretical framework. Gil Stein has 
40 wallerstein, World-System Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University press, 
2004), 16–17.
41 Gil J. Stein, “world System theory and alternative Modes of Interaction in the archae-
ology of culture contact,” in Studies in Culture Contact: Interaction, Cultural Change, and 
Archaeological Investigations, Occasional Paper No. 25., ed. J.G. cusick (carbondale, Ill.: 
Southern Illinois University, 1998), 224.
42 phil Kohl, “the ancient economy, transferable technologies and the Bronze age 
world-System: a View from the Northeastern Frontier of the ancient Near east,” in Centre 
and Periphery in the Ancient World, eds. M. rowlands et al. (cambridge: cambridge Univer-
sity press, 1987), 13–24. Jane Schneider made the first attempt to situate world systems to 
an earlier period; Schneider, “was there a pre-capitalist world-System?” Peasant Studies 
6 (1977): 20–29.
43 Guillermo algaze, The Uruk World System: The Dynamics of Expansion of Early Meso-
potamian Civilizations (chicago: University of chicago, 2005), andre Gunder Frank et al., 
“Bronze age world Systems cycles (and comments and reply),” Current Anthropology 34 
(1993): 383–429.
44 “there was in this way of formulating the unit of analysis a further link to older 
ideas.” wallerstein ties his model to polanyian categories, recognizing earlier historical 
contexts for a world system; wallerstein, World-System Analysis: An Introduction, 17.
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outlined some serious difficulties with the application of wallerstein to 
these ancient Near eastern economies.45 Stein argues that vast distances 
have a leveling affect, thereby preventing any single polity to economi-
cally exploit vast amounts of territory. Stein looks to the metal-rich ana-
tolian periphery as evidence against such exploitation, as they exported 
highly-advanced finished goods, rather than pure materials as wallerstein 
theorized. the only core-peripheral exploitation was military in nature, in 
which the periphery would send goods but only through the motivation of 
military coercion and not market developments, thereby refuting the very 
heart of wallerstein’s model. Schloen argues that those who revise the 
model also strip it of any analytical usefulness.46 Despite these criticisms, 
many world-systems apologists continue to advocate this paradigm.
In addition to theoretical explanations of ancient Near eastern econo-
mies, Marxism has had a significant impact on economic topics within 
biblical studies in two other ways. First, Marxist theorists developed a 
conceptual framework on formation of the Israelite state through the 
peasant-revolt theory of George Mendenhall and Norman Gottwald.47 
this model explains the settlement of the Israelite nation as a group of 
oppressed peasants, banding together and forming an egalitarian polity 
in early Israel. although both archaeologists and philologists have largely 
discredited such theories, the peasant-revolt theory provided an alterna-
tive to the maximalist interpretation of Israelite settlement in the wake 
of Kenyon’s Jericho and other attacks on biblical historiography.48 Most 
importantly, the peasant-revolt theory instigated the usage of social sci-
entific theory in historical reconstructions. Such an interpretation under-
scores the socially distinct character of economic structures apart from 
the despotic rulers of the ancient Near east.
45 Stein, “world System theory,” 220–255; Stein, Rethinking World-Systems: Diaspo-
ras, Colonies, and Interaction in Uruk Mesopotamia (tucson: University of arizona press, 
1999). 
46 Schloen, The House of the Father, 85–89.
47 Norman K. Gottwald, The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated 
Israel, 1250–1050 B.C.E. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: orbis Books, 1979); George e. Mendenhall, “the 
hebrew conquest of palestine,” BA 25 (1962): 66–87.
48 For examples of criticism against the peasant revolt theory, see anson rainey, review 
of Norman Gottwald, The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel 
(1250–1050 B.C.E.), JAOS 107 (1987): 541–543; Lawrence Stager, “Forging an Identity: the 
emergence of ancient Israel,” in The Oxford History of the Biblical World, ed. M.D. coogan 
(oxford: oxford University press, 1998), 90–131.
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Second, Marxist interpretation has found legitimacy among the 
crowded field of post-colonial hermeneutics.49 the influential liberation 
theologians used material poverty and class conflict as a starting-point for 
expressing their theological agenda with the main difference of the salvific 
construct of liberation rather than class conflict in ultimately bringing 
social change—a radical modification from Marxist atheism! positively, 
Marxist interpretation forces a view of theory that must explicitly grapple 
with economic issues though the focus of these studies tend to be more 
theological and ideological rather than historical. these Marxist herme-
neutic studies can benefit greatly from a deliberate study of the economic 
structures presumed within the biblical texts.
2.1.c. Max Weber
Until recently, most scholars have dismissed any conceptual points of 
contact between Marx and Max weber.50 Marx centered his theories 
around exploitation and class consciousness, yet weber never explicitly 
developed any such concept of exploitation. Marx built a fiercely anti- 
capitalist model, whereas weber taught economics from the vantage point 
of a member of the German historical School, accepting many of the 
rationalist positions of Neo-classicism.51 But under a wider perspective, 
both attempted to deal with the seemingly obvious challenges to classical 
political economy. whereas Marx finds a starting point in empathy for 
the oppressed, weber’s view of ancient economies embodies his holistic, 
anti-positivist account of society. weber believed that analysis of societies 
must go beyond mere external signs and seek underlying paradigms and 
values that govern social behavior.
rather than assuming the universalism of homo economicus, weber iden-
tified formalist economic behavior as a limited ideal type (Verstehendes).52 
weber explicitly pointed out that such a concept of homo economicus was 
49 For a summary bibliography on Marxist hermeneutics, see Fernando F. Segovia, 
“reading the Bible Ideologically: Socioeconomic criticism,” in To Each Its Own Meaning, 
eds. Steven L. McKenzie, Stephen r. haynes (Louisville: westminster John Knox, 1999), 
283–306.
50 For recent studies on the relationship of Marx and weber, see erik olin wright, “the 
Shadow of exploitation in weber’s class analysis,” American Sociological Review 67 (2002): 
832–853.
51 richard Swedberg, “Max weber as an economist and as a Sociologist: towards a 
Fuller Understanding of weber’s View of economics,” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 58 (1999): 561–582.
52 Swedberg, “weber as an economist,” 564.
Nam, Roger S.. Portrayals of Economic Exchange in the Book of Kings, BRILL, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,
         http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgefox/detail.action?docID=867709.
Created from georgefox on 2019-04-26 11:01:01.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 B
R
IL
L.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
unique to western peoples and their actions, but one cannot straitjacket 
such a presumption on every economy through time. Modern economic 
theory inevitably projects a particular setting, that is, perfect economic 
knowledge, perfect decision-making (economic rationality) and tireless 
devotion to self-gain. weber argued that a rationalist ideal type does not 
account for the non-economic motivations of decision-makers. In react-
ing against such rationality, weber declared, “economics is not a science 
of nature and its qualities, but of people and their needs.”53 whereas clas-
sical economics can have merit in certain settings, weber acknowledged 
the presence of non-rational behavior in the greater economic structure, 
particularly in non-western cultures.
the assumption of economic rationality as an ideal type allowed weber 
to disregard homo economicus assumptions for the ancient Near east in 
favor of specific ideal types to describe the economic conditions. Most 
prominently, he argued that the concept of patrimonialism served as the 
most informative ideal type for the ancient Near east.54 essentially, the 
larger governing structures, such as the royal court and the temple, pat-
tern themselves after family households. patrimonialism was a much more 
accurate description of many governing systems of the ancient Near east, 
rather than a more rational impersonal bureaucracy. patriarchy drove the 
governance of individual households, and planted the foundation for a 
rule by patrimonialism, the governance of a polity or chiefdom.55 
Several scholars apply this concept of patrimonialism to the Near east, 
and recent years have seen a major revival of weber’s patrimonialism on 
ancient economic systems. Schloen’s work on the patrimonial structure 
of Late Bronze age Ugarit provides an attractive option to the domi-
nant two-sector model.56 Schloen argues that despite all of its diversity in 
topography and cultural contacts, all Bronze age systems display a unifor-
mity that strongly aligns with a patrimonial model. the basic household 
model was adapted into larger social structures and became the dominant 
governing mechanism. the model also provides enough flexibility in its 
broad application without suffering from reductionism. this non-rational 
53 Max weber, The Agrarian Society of Ancient Civilizations, trans. r.I. Frank (London: 
NLB press, 1976), 32.
54 Several have criticized weber’s association of patrimonialism with medieval euro-
pean feudalism, though it is evident that weber himself recognized this difference. See 
Schloen, The House of the Father, 52. a feudal vassal had the legal rights of a free man and 
was not a member of the feudal lord’s household.
55 Max weber, Economy and Society (Stanford: Stanford University press, 2005).
56 Schloen, The House of the Father.
Nam, Roger S.. Portrayals of Economic Exchange in the Book of Kings, BRILL, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,
         http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgefox/detail.action?docID=867709.
Created from georgefox on 2019-04-26 11:01:01.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 B
R
IL
L.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
economic system was disrupted by the string of “world empires” begin-
ning with the Neo-assyrians, which began to create economic structure 
that included elements of rationality. although critics have challenged the 
universality of patrimonialism as an ideal type during the Late Bronze 
age, Schloen makes a convincing case of its presence on every level of 
ancient society.57 
this and other ideal types serve a distinct methodological function—
they were somewhat artificially dichotomous, but they acknowledged the 
integrated nature of social understandings.58 this recognition is the hall-
mark of weber’s lasting influence on the humanities, and fundamentally 
in contention with classical political economy. the sterile theories of eco-
nomic formalism leave little room for cultural and social influences on 
economic decisions. Behavioral decisions based on prestige and etiquette 
are not only impossible to quantify, they are often contrarian to maximiz-
ing behavior. thus, studies of the ancient Near east require more holistic 
thinking and analysis beyond rational economics.
this anti-positivist attitude influenced weber’s understanding of the 
ancient Israel through his work, Ancient Judaism and again in a chapter 
on Israel in Agrarian Societies.59 For weber, the law codes provide the 
most reliable sources for ancient Israelite society. these codes, specifically 
the Book of the covenant and Deuteronomy, permit the scholar to move 
from the theoretical ideal type to see a glimpse of the historical Israel.60 
In studying this law, weber deduced several characteristics of the Isra-
elite economy. the laws assume a money economy based on regulations 
on loans and deposits. the biblical laws make no mention of any sort of 
collective ownership, rather property initially fell within the control of 
a family. Most importantly, the Israelite nation distinguishes itself from 
57 For criticism, see Daniel e. Fleming, “Schloen’s patrimonial pyramid: explaining 
Bronze age Society,” BASOR 328 (2002): 73–80; christopher Mountfort Monroe, review of 
J. David Schloen, The House of the Father as Fact and Symbol: Patrimonialism in Ugarit and 
the Ancient Near East,” JAOS 122 (2002): 904–907.
58 In addition to patrimonialism, the “ancient city” is another weberian ideal type 
placed on Mesopotamian society. For weber, the Mesopotamian city was oppressively 
despotic compared the “ancient city” of classical Greece, which encouraged freedom and 
forms of democracy, deliberately providing legal status to its citizenry. this underlying 
value made the Mesopotamian “ancient city” a net consumer of goods, collecting in-kind 
payments from the periphery; see Max weber, The City: Non-Legitimate Domination, trans. 
claus wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of california press, 1973); see critique by Marc 
van de Mieroop, The Ancient Mesopotamian City (oxford: oxford University press, 1999).
59 weber, The Agrarian Society of Ancient Civilizations, 137; Max weber, Ancient Judaism, 
trans. hans h. Gerth and Don Martindale (New York: the Free press, 1952), 32.
60 weber, Ancient Judaism, 61–89.
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neighboring cultures by their commitment to covenant in regulating their 
economic structure. whereas many cultures displayed a relatively unified 
religious cult among the peoples, Israel’s religion focuses on a conception 
of direct agreement between the people and the deity. Yhwh is more than 
a mere witness to the covenant pledge, but rather a fully-involved partici-
pant. consequently, the divine intimacy demands that the Israelite people 
abide by mechanisms to maintain a high egalitarian ethos within the eco-
nomic structure. with the transformation from loose tribal structure to 
monarchy, the covenant continues to regulate the distributive process of 
ancient Israel. through deep valleys and high plateaus, the topography of 
Israel makes despotic centralized control impossible. thus, the concept 
of covenant regulates the distributive process of ancient Israel to maintain 
fairness and access. this egalitarian spirit contrasts with neighboring Mes-
opotamia, which went through periods of full-fledged despotic regimes.61 
Both Marxism and weber’s anti-positivist school provided legitimate 
intellectual challenges to many of the formulations of classical political 
economy. But such challenges did not make much of a pervasive impact 
on ancient economic history by the time of weber’s death in 1920. In the 
western world, the advocacy for free markets and fewer constraints was 
too strong of a force. at the beginning of the twentieth century, Mill’s 
textbook was still standard in many British and american university eco-
nomic departments. only the devastation of world war I and its drawn 
out recovery could shatter the optimism of classical political economy as 
well as many of the social sciences. the ensuing decade would be for-
mative for the development of the field, and consequently, to our own 
understanding of economic anthropology as it applies to the ancient 
Near east.
2.2. The Pioneering Economic Anthropologists
Despite alternative theoretical tracks from Marx and weber, by the end 
of world war I, the precepts of classical political economy of homo eco-
nomicus still drove most western scholarship. cultural considerations 
played little role, not only in understanding economic decisions, but in 
the entire humanities field. More significantly, ethnocentricism perme-
61 Unlike Marx, weber had access to primary ancient Near eastern sources. In mak-
ing his assessment of Mesopotamia, weber claims that 200,000 cuneiform documents had 
already been translated; weber, The Agrarian Society of Ancient Civilizations, 103–104.
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ated the social sciences. a 1930 synopsis of the burgeoning field of eco-
nomic anthropology speculates on the acceptance of homo economicus as 
universally axiomatic:
Until recently most students believed that primitive men had no economic 
life worth studying. economists were not interested in them: for were not 
these folk savages? they possessed only a small amount of material goods, 
had little private property, and often no money, tolerated no great amount 
of free enterprise, and did not produce for a market.62
to many scholars of the time, it was inconceivable how such a primi-
tive culture could offer anything of observable value to western advanced 
societies.
within this context, substantivist economic anthropology symbolically 
emerged with the studies of Bronislaw Malinowski. In an attempt to bet-
ter contextualize his scholarship, he lived among a Melanesian tribe and 
learned their native languages.63 although Malinowski was trained in the 
theories of classical political economy, he quickly began to realize the 
shortcomings of these theories in his study of the trobriand Islanders, par-
ticularly in regards to the exchange patterns in the kula ring. Malinowski 
outlined three major spheres of exchange: subsistence, prestige, kula. In 
the subsistence sphere, the islanders send yams to the village chief, who 
must allocate them for public feasting. the prestige sphere has different 
items for women and men. the women exchange non-commercial prod-
ucts made from banana leaves for occasions such as marriage and funer-
ary arrangements. these banana leaves provide protective magic against 
sorcery as well as symbols of strength to the community. the male prestige 
sphere involves axe blades, clay pots, yams, tusks and canoes, and men 
exchange these items as dowry, compensation for murder and prizes. the 
kula ring includes armshells and necklaces around a seven hundred mile 
chain of islands. alongside this ceremonial exchange, this trade system 
maintains a parallel secondary trade in utilitarian items (foodstuffs, raw 
materials, manufactures, etc.). within the context of cultural immersion, 
62 Maurice G. Smith, “review of primitive economics of the New Zealand Maori by 
raymond Firth,” American Anthropologist 32 (1930): 548.
63 this in itself was a huge turning point in anthropological research. Until Malinowski 
and phil Boaz, most anthropologists spent an extremely limited amount of time in the 
field. Malinowski’s immersion in the Micronesian culture begat high-quality field reports 
and detailed observations; Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific; an 
Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea 
(London: routledge, 1932). 
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Malinowski quickly recognized trobriand economic activity defying the 
contruct of homo economicus.
Malinowski’s observations of the trobriand Island economy forced a 
new understanding of economic rules, governed by the a new set of eco-
nomic assumptions, now playfully termed as homo reciprocans.64 conse-
quently, Malinowski set up his own principles to articulate how classical 
political economy is not universal: (1) people are socially-motivated and 
inherently cooperative (2) people inherently change for the community; 
(3) in primitive (non-tainted) societies, needs and wants are largely met; 
(4) the trobriand Islander is not out to maximize, but rather he follows a 
complex set of traditional forces: duties and obligations, beliefs and magic, 
social ambition and vanities; and (5) the larger family or tribe makes the 
primary economic decisions, and thus serves as the unit of analysis.
homo economicus 
(1)  people act selfishly.
(2)  people inherently exchange for maximizing.
(3)  Universal scarcities of needs/wants drive economic decisions.
(4) when people are rational (have knowledge), they maximize and 
strategize.
(5) the individual serves as the unit of analysis.
homo reciprocans
(1)  people are socially-motivated and inherently cooperative.
(2)  people inherently exchange for the community.
(3)  Needs/wants are largely met.
(4)  people follow a complex set of traditional forces: duties and obliga-
tions, beliefs and magic, social ambition and vanities.
(5)  the larger family or tribe serves as the unit of analysis. 
In other words, Malinowski determined that the trobriand Islander 
acts in a way antithetical to homo economicus, directly confronting the 
ethnocentrisms of rational economics. with the lingering effects of a post- 
enlightenment climate, Malinowski arose as a true forerunner of post- 
modernity. Unsurprisingly, the academic response was quite passionate. 
Many decried Malinowski as too relativistic and intellectually dishonest. 
64 the term homo reciprocans was coined by Samuel Bowles, “Social organization and 
the evolution of Norms,” in Sante Fe Institute Science Board Symposium (1999).
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But others followed Malinowski to solidify the cultural sensitivity to eco-
nomic theory. their overall goal was to develop a grand theory of eco-
nomics that applied to both western and non-western systems. these 
anthropologists sought to sift through classic political economy and 
adjust it to a more universal paradigm. Many of the basic outlines of 
homo economicus were not completely discarded, but modified. everyone 
had basic wants, but these wants were culturally-determined. For exam-
ple, non-monetary economies did not value gold as highly as monetary 
economies. 
two scholars in particular made lasting contributions to economic 
anthropology, by simultaneously expanding and refuting Malinowski’s 
observations. First, Malinowski’s student, raymond Firth, studied eco-
nomic patterns of the Maori tribes of his native New Zealand.65 Under 
Malinowski’s direction, Firth recognized complexity in exchange as well 
as forces of prestige and honor triumphing supply-and-demand. Firth 
determined that western people operate under western economic law, 
while Maori people operate under Maori economic law. all cultures have 
powerful notions of needs and wants. But sometimes they want prestige 
more than commodities and thus act accordingly. In this way, Firth actu-
ally laid a foundation for later formalists by asserting supply-and-demand 
actually as universal, by commodifying prestige, like silver or grain.
Second, Marcel Mauss challenged Malinowski’s notion of reciprocity.66 
Malinowski observed the trobriand islander as a very independant 
actor within a greater structure. But Mauss emphasized the dominance 
of kinship relations, which in turn fuels relations and obligations within 
the group. thus, a simple act of exchange serves as a complex expres-
sion of peoples, objects and their social relations with each other, thus 
they are fundamentally different from commodities. Gifts dominate the 
exchange patterns in Malinowski’s Melanesia and Firth’s New Zealand, 
while commodities dominate industrial societies. Gifts do not have util-
itarian function as a commodity, but rather, they maintain and uproot 
social relations. thus, any study of gift exchange must seek to understand 
not only the commodity, but the social network of the giver and receiver. 
though later scholars understood the potential for both gifts and com-
modities to exist in a single society, Mauss openly dismissed the idea of 
65 raymond Firth, Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori (London: George 
routledge, 1929).
66 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. 
Ian cunnison (Glencoe: Free press, 1954).
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any disinterested trading within the kula ring.67 It appears, however, that 
the traditional reciprocal exchange of the kula ring facilitated utilitarian 
market exchange.
Significantly, one must recognize the settings of these pioneering 
thoughts on economic anthropology. a disproportionate amount of these 
theories emerged from observations on the trobriand Islanders of the 
kula ring, and the Maori tribes of New Zealand. although ancient Near 
eastern research sometimes quote from these anthropologists, one must 
remember the enormous differences between these island communities 
and the historical settings for the biblical texts. the trobriand Islands 
exist in a very spacious, rain-driven agricultural community with its main 
commodities consisting of tarot, bananas, fish and coconut. the kula ring 
would give large caravans to other neighboring communities that had rel-
atively similar geo-political climates. with such homogeneity, one would 
not expect many of the marginal benefits to apply to inter-island trade of 
the kula ring. thus, formalist economic theory asserts that rational peo-
ple would not trade nor transport coconuts from hundreds of miles away 
when they were available from the local village. In this sense, the island 
community of Micronesia is a sharp contrast to the geological diversity of 
the Southern Levant in the Iron age. If the homogenous trobriand island-
ers still integrated utilitarian trade into their socially-embedded network, 
one must certainly anticipate a degree of utilitarian trade in the topo-
graphically diverse Southern Levant.
Malinowski revealed the shortcomings of the homo economicus model 
in a more forceful way than any previous scholarship. Both Marx and 
weber derived their models from theoretical abstract formulations, later 
supported by evidence from other cultures. But the pioneering economic 
anthropologists tended to work in an opposite direction. they began with 
observations and descriptions of a living social system, both non-western 
and pre-capitalist. Most of the Malinowski’s work was devoted to mere 
description of this system, then later he made more holistic observations 
on these systems, later refined by others who also had first-hand testi-
mony of these non-tainted systems.
67 James carrier, “Gifts, commodities, and Social relations: a Maussian View of 
exchange,” Sociological Forum 6 (1991): 119–136.
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2.3. Karl Polanyi
2.3.a. The Great Transformation
although the early economic anthropologists recognized tribal economic 
behavior as aberrant in regards to classical political economy, they did 
not have the theoretical foundations to articulate a clear counter to 
capitalist formulations. But over time, their observations reached Karl 
polanyi, who frequently quoted from these anthropologists to provide an 
empirical basis for his brilliant synthesis and expression of the mecha-
nisms of exchange. Ironically, polanyi never intended to impact the field 
of economic anthropology to such an extent. By education and trade, 
he was a lawyer, journalist, and economic historian with the aspirations 
of influencing modern social policy in his native hungary. the concepts 
of socially-embedded economies provided a powerful tool for analysis of 
periods like the Great Depression and fascism. as polanyi developed his 
own universal theory of exchange, he began to look to the ancient Near 
east, and primarily old Babylonia, in order to validate his paradigm. his 
appointment at columbia University and subsequent collaboration with 
Leo oppenheim helped to disseminate his theories to Near eastern schol-
ars, primarily assyriologists.
In the hugely influential The Great Transformation, polanyi explained 
the emergence of the market economy, which arrived in england at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, then subsequently spread to the 
rest of the industrial world.68 polanyi described this “Great transforma-
tion” as creating an economy disembedded from social relations. the 
industrial economy streamlined economic processes to the standard of 
money, and set distributive decisions in terms of supply-and-demand. 
essentially, polanyi saw the development of the “Great transformation” 
as an entrance into an economic world negotiated by adam Smith. But 
unlike Smith, polanyi thought that such a transformation had disastrous 
consequences. By allowing unregulated markets, nineteenth century eng-
land removed “the protective covering of cultural institutions,” allowing 
the people to, “perish from the effects of social exposure.”69 Furthermore, 
poalnyi invoked Malthus to assert that free markets can never sustain 
68 polanyi, The Great Transformation.
69 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 72–73.
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themselves as they deplete all resources.70 after the movement to a more 
capitalist society, countermeasures emerged to regulate the extent by 
which distribution could follow supply-and-demand. these countermea-
sures worked in that they partially re-embedded the economic structures, 
typically through socialism or the welfare state. thus, despite their vast 
ideological differences, polanyi observed the intra-war political move-
ments of fascism, socialism and the New Deal as all attempting to repair 
the failures of an unregulated economy.71
the main problem with an unregulated free market centered on the 
unmitigated confidence in the construct of homo economicus. polanyi 
insisted that all previous economic systems did not rely on such a stan-
dard. Implicitly referring to Malinowski’s research on the trobriand 
Islanders, polanyi famously wrote:
the outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research 
is that man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. he 
does not act to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of mate-
rial goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, 
his social assets.72
Many pre-capitalist societies may have had markets, but supply-and-
demand did not regulate them. of course, money existed, but true mon-
etary transactions occurred within a very limited segment of the society.73 
allocation of resources, particularly land, depended on kinship ties and 
the community. thus, distribution of goods and services did not rely on 
price-setting markets, but rather on the economically robust mechanisms 
of reciprocity and redistribution.74 
70 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 76–77, for connection between polanyi and 
Malthus, see Garreth Dale, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market (cambridge: polity press, 
2010), 52–58.
71 w.L. Goldfrank interprets the “Great transformation” to refer not to the inception 
of market economies, but the inception of these 1930s regimes that attempted to recap-
ture the control over the failures of adam Smith laissez-faire; w.L. Goldfrank, “Facism and 
The Great Transformation,” in The Life and Work of Karl Polanyi, ed. Kari polanyi-Levitt 
(Montreal: Black rose Books, 1990), 87.
72 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 46.
73 polanyi recognized that money itself is a socially ambiguous device. Many non- 
capitalist societies had special-purpose money, which only circulated within specific parts 
of a society and did not serve as a universal standard of value. See Michel panoff, “Marcel 
Mauss’s “the Gift” revisited,” Man 5 (1970): 66.
74 polanyi also had a fourth mechanism, “householding” that he outlined in The Great 
Transformation but never developed. this was production explicitly for one’s own extended 
household in archaic states such as Dahomey in the eighteenth century. polanyi, The Great 
Transformation, 53.
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2.3.b. Reciprocity
In The Great Transformation, polanyi adopted his view of reciprocity from 
Malinowski’s research of kula ring exchange. the trobriand islands main-
tain important symmetrical arrangements, which allow for individuals to 
exchange goods, not out of supply-and-demand, but rather to maintain 
social position within the larger group. polanyi argued that a male head-
of-household may send his finest crops to his sister’s family without any 
immediate material reward as one would expect in a purely commercial 
transaction. But with such an act, the giver will increase in prestige, and 
his own family will materially benefit from the increased reputation. 
eventually, the sister’s family will compensate to maintain the symmetry. 
Further examination of the Micronesia society reveals that such symme-
try is pervasive in other social spheres. a coastal village has an inland 
counterpart to enable both to take advantage of marginal utility. Individ-
ual participants of kula ring trade have distant partners on other islands 
to trade commodities under disjointed chronology, sometimes as long as 
years. Because of the social concern for maintaining symmetry, reciproc-
ity serves as an extraordinary motivator and regulator of economic activ-
ity. In a direct attack against homo economicus, polanyi proclaimed, “the 
economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization.”75 
whereas classical political economy separates the economic and political 
spheres, polanyi amalgamated them back together. polanyi even argued 
that the trobriand Islander illustrates that reciprocity could manage such 
a complex exchange system much more efficiently than market forces.76
polanyi further articulated his mechanism of reciprocity in “the 
economy as Instituted process.”77 here, polanyi specifically ties recipro-
cal exchange as a reflection of a greater organized structure. In looking 
at non-capitalist societies, polanyi concluded that these cohesive kin-
ship groups, rather than aggregate individuals, serve as the fundamental 
core of the economic system. Such a system necessitates the mechanism 
of reciprocity as the dominant means of exchange with redistribution 
75 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 49.
76 “an intricate time-space-person system covering hundreds of miles and several 
decades, linking many hundreds of people in respect to thousands of strictly individual 
objects, is bing handled here without any records of administration, but also without any 
motive of gain or truck,” polanyi, The Great Transformation, 50.
77 Karl polanyi, “the economy as Instituted process,” in Trade and Market in the Early 
Empires, eds. Karl polanyi, conrad M. arensberg and harry w. pearson (Glencoe, Ill.: Free 
press, 1957), 239–270.
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and market exchange taking subordinate roles. thus, reciprocity occurs 
through taking turns to circulate goods. also, reciprocity may occur via set 
equivalencies, though this does not necessarily change the social nature of 
the transaction. For these societies, all exchange mechanisms ultimately 
reflect the symmetrical nature of the social relationship of the economic 
players.78
2.3.c. Redistribution
whereas polanyi emphasized the kinship structures of Micronesia to facil-
itate reciprocity, he connected the tribal chief to redistribution. But rather 
than symmetry, redistribution depends on centricity for its effectiveness. 
the tribal chief has the authority for collection and the capacity for stor-
age. the communal center acts as the consistent locale for the actual 
redistribution of collected goods through festivals and ceremonial feasts. 
the tribal chief ultimately must maintain a division of labor, taxation for 
public works and defensive positions. polanyi noted the extraordinary 
coordination required for the effectiveness of redistribution in Microne-
sia, particularly without the control of archives and written records. For 
example, a hunting tribe may go on an expedition, where productivity is 
extremely capricious, yet the centricity of the society through the tribal 
chief insures to socially protect those involved in the hunt, and to evenly 
compensate their families despite such irregularity in productivity.
polanyi associated redistribution as a dominant exchange mechanism 
for the centralized polities of the ancient Near east, particularly old Baby-
lonia under hammurapi and New Kingdom egypt. here, the influence of 
Leo oppenheim is unmistakable. polanyi suggested that the ruling gov-
ernment could centralize on an enormous scale, then redistribute on a 
graded scale, using “sharply differentiated rations.”79 an intricate system 
of storehouses allows for the collection of all types of peasant surplus, 
78 Marshall Sahlins divided reciprocity into three types: (1) general reciprocity high-
lights generosity and allowed for unmitigated payment of obligation; (2) balanced reci-
procity stresses the egalitarian nature of trade and made means for timely payment; and 
(3) negative reciprocity emphasizes the selfish act of the giver in gaining power. even 
more so than polanyi, Sahlins brought attention to the social nature of reciprocity, though 
in doing so, he neglected the utilitarian aspects. this will have important repercussions 
on studies of reciprocity and the Bible. Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (chicago: 
aldine-atherton, 1972). Later, ekkehard Stegemann and wolfgang Stegemann add a fourth 
category of “familial reciprocity.” ekkehard and wolfgang Stegemann, The Jesus Movement: 
A Social History of the First Century (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 36.
79 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 54.
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whether from breeders, hunters, bakers, brewers, potters, weavers, etc. 
these products move from smaller, peripheral storehouses, until they 
made their way to the larger storehouses, recorded under the royal archi-
val system. 
within the edited volume, oppenheim wrote his own article further 
articulating the intricacies of redistribution in the ancient Near east.80 he 
argued that Mesopotamian economics centered on redistribution as the 
most fundamental concept based on the importance of cereal agriculture 
and its concomitant need for irrigation, urbanization and temple eco-
nomics. these factors are all prevalent in the Mesopotamian records, and 
they provide a basis for overturning anachronistic economic thinking and 
replacing it with a highly complex, yet efficient model of redistribution. 
oppenheim writes that the benefits of such a redistributive economy are 
obvious:
It fosters the accumulation of staples in the royal or divine household, com-
pelling it to evolve bureaucratic methods to deal with those accumulations 
by stock-taking, budgeting, and assigning income and expenditures on a 
large scale. an elaborate system of equivalencies was developed to manage 
in an efficient way the array of different foodstuffs, materials for manufac-
turing, payments in kind to personnel, etc. these techniques—especially 
the use of equivalences—influenced all contacts of the redistributive system 
with the outside world and developed into an important means of exercis-
ing the political power which is inherent in such an economic situation.81 
oppenheim acknowledged the development of international trade some-
times under organized bureaucracy, and sometimes under individual 
desire. But he argued that such developments are atypical in the eco-
nomic structure.
polanyi noted the social consequences of redistribution in that not 
all societies may embrace egalitarian ethos in patterns of redistribution. 
Interestingly, polanyi emphasized that those controlling the redistribution, 
whether aristocratic family, or a monarch, wanted to increase their politi-
cal power, rather than material accumulation.82 Such an interpretation 
80 a. Leo oppenheim, “a Bird’s eye View of Mesopotamian economic history,” in Trade 
and Market in the Early Empires, eds. Karl polanyi, conrad M. arensberg and harry w. 
pearson (Glencoe, Ill.: the Free press, 1957), 27–37.
81 oppenheim, “a Bird eye’s View,” 31–32.
82 “whether the redistributing is performed by an influential family or an outstand-
ing individual, a ruling aristocracy or a group of bureaucrats, they will often attempt to 
increase their political power by the manner in which they redistribute the goods,” polanyi, 
The Great Transformation, 53.
Nam, Roger S.. Portrayals of Economic Exchange in the Book of Kings, BRILL, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,
         http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgefox/detail.action?docID=867709.
Created from georgefox on 2019-04-26 11:01:01.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 B
R
IL
L.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
allowed polanyi to deal with the historical problem of people seemingly 
wanting more and more material goods within the cuneiform evidence. If 
polanyi had acquiesced to the existence of material greed, then he would 
have undermined his own arguments against the universality of scarcity. 
2.3.d. Market Exchange
reciprocity and redistibution dominate polanyi’s understanding of the 
ancient Near east. Both mechanisms work in concert with the social matri-
ces to maintain integration and regulate the greater economic structure. 
Similar to Malinowski, polanyi recognized that reciprocal and redistribu-
tive mechanisms do not assume a simplistic economy. rather, he noted 
the enormous complexity of the kula ring, and even questioned whether 
forces of supply-and-demand had the capacity to effectively regulate such 
intricate exchange.83 
the natural ensuing question concerns the place of market economy. 
Needing to reconcile his fierce anti-market polemic with some of the 
ancient textual evidence for long-distance trade, polanyi categorized 
three main types of trade: gift trade, administered trade and market trade. 
Gift trade, as polanyi described, seems indistinguishable from reciprocal 
exchange, particularly since he invoked the kula ring as an illustration 
of such trade.84 over vast distances, gift trade involves empires through 
presentation ceremonies, embassies and accompanying political dialogue 
with such trade. the gifts are elite goods and the frequency of exchange 
is quite limited, though it ultimately depends on sociological factors, such 
as the relative status of the two parties.
Government-controlled channels administered trade through formal 
treaty arrangements. thus, heads-of-state specifically determined the cru-
cial variables of the trading process: equivalency, ports, quality control, 
weighing, storage and safeguarding. In describing administered trade, 
polanyi was careful not to mention any capitalist terminology, and if he 
did, he mentioned them in quotations (e.g. “rates,” “payments”).85 polanyi 
insisted that while polity leaders negotiate many of the variables, they do 
not negotiate over price in order to maintain the permanent trading bod-
ies, whose treaties are protected by divine powers. to support the concept 
of administered trade, polanyi cited from a variety of historical settings 
83 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 50.
84 polanyi, “the economy as Instituted process,” 262.
85 polanyi, “the economy as Instituted process,” 262.
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such as aztec-Maya commerce in Mesoamerica, west africa’s Guinea 
coast in the eighteenth century and precolonial asia along the Malabar 
coast of India. In the ancient Near east, polanyi appealed to both indepen-
dent city-states under the aegis of greater empires (Ugarit) and city-states 
that had their own advantage in naval superiority (tyre).86 In much of 
The Great Transformation, polanyi defined market exchange quite rigidly 
in that all components of trade, including land, labor and currency were 
pure commodities without any barrier to a free flowing exchange.87
Market trade is the most recent phenomenon and the creator of mate-
rial wealth in the western world. Supply-and-demand markets reduce 
economic acts from their social matrices and make exchange into an 
impersonal transaction. Unlike reciprocity and redistribution, market 
trade places a high value on the aggregate decision makers and the equiv-
alencies that arise from these decisions. Market trade is unique in that it 
has the capacity to trade every single commodity, including the commodi-
ties involved in such trade (storage, transport, tolls, etc.). In the modern 
world, polanyi pointed out that supply-and-demand were really separate 
forces that did not always end up in equilibrium as long as the market 
could accommodate them both. here, polanyi deliberately changes termi-
nology from “equivalency” to “price” as the latter is now subject to massive 
fluctuation.
2.3.e. The Problem of Terminology
In keeping with polanyi’s economic anthropology, the ensuing chapters 
will use these rubrics to categorize biblical texts. at the same time, it is 
useful to consider two specific problems with polanyi’s terminology of 
reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange as applicable to these 
portrayals of economic exchange. 
First, these terms carry a considerably wide semantic range within 
the field of economic anthropology. Sometimes, even polanyi himself is 
inconsistent in usage of these terms. he has varying definitions of market 
exchange even within The Great Transformation. Garreth Dale describes 
one version of market exchange as identical to the capital markets of 
86 Karl polanyi, “ports of trade in early Societies,” The Journal of Economic History 23 
(1963), 38. For analysis, see abraham rotstein, “Karl polanyi’s concept of Non-Market 
trade,” The Journal of Economic History 30 (1970): 117–126.
87 polanyi, The Great Transformation, 45, 72, 205; see Dale, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of 
the Market, 49.
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Neo-classicalism with commodification of all goods and services, lead-
ing to such economic characteristics as the creation of true money and 
credit.88 the second version of market exchange relies on supply-and-
demand, but only with inputs from governments and other agencies like 
the church, which owned the land. thus, the major factor to production 
did not rely on the market. Dale observes that, “polanyi rarely feels the 
need to clarify which of these uses he has in mind, although he is aware 
that different definition are in play.”89 Because of these restrictions, the 
study will explain alternative usages of reciprocity, redistribution and 
market exchange when applicable. For example, chapter three intro-
duces alternative forms of reciprocity, such Marshall Sahlins idea of asym-
metrical reciprocity, Yunxiang Yan’s version of “vertical reciprocity” or 
charles Stanish’s view of competitive feasting, or “deferred reciprocity”.90 
the following chapters must define the meaning and elucidate these 
ambiguities in the terminology. 
a second, related concern is that the terms have presuppositions that 
do not necessary reflect the specific conditions of the exchange. For exam-
ple, polanyi insisted that reciprocity is ultimately symmetrical, though this 
does not necessarily match the biblical portrayals of reciprocity such as the 
gift exchange with Sheba. as a correlary, polanyian redistribution is asym-
metrical and centric, but this does not adequately explains the feasting 
behind the Samaria ostraca. Such an outcome naturally reflects the fact 
that polanyi intended for his categories of exchange to help with modern 
economic policy, particularly for eastern europe and not as descriptors of 
ancient economies. as an anthropological theorist, polanyi’s descriptions 
are often too overtly ideological to properly fit a specific historical con-
text. this is most true with some of his descriptions on market exchange. 
In some instances, polanyi describes this version of market exchange as a 
type of utopian vision in the framework of a weberian ideal type. 
But in line with the social scientific approach, the following chapters will 
demonstrate that despite these issues, polanyi’s terms can still provide a 
helpful conceptual framework to categorize the portrayals of exchange. to 
directly confront problems of ambiguity, anachronism and preconceived 
88 Dale, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market, 50–51.
89 Dale, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market, 73.
90 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics; Yunxiang Yan, “the Gift and Gift economy,” in A 
Handbook of Economic Anthropology, ed. James carrier (cheltenham: edward elgar, 2005), 
246–261; charles Stanish, Ancient Titicaca: The Evolution of Complex Societies in Southern 
Peru and Northern Bolivia (Berkeley: University of california press, 2003).
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ideology, the beginning of each of the chapters on portrayals of reciproc-
ity, redistribution and market exchange will attempt to clarify the con-
cepts of exchange both theoretically and through examples from ancient 
Near eastern text and material culture, or even modern ethnography. the 
terminology will not dictate the discussion, but merely allow for contextu-
alizing observations on economic activities within 1 and 2 Kings.
2.4. Reactions to Polanyi
the modern emergence of price-setting markets presumes their earlier 
absence during all periods of the ancient Near east, including hellenis-
tic times. thus, the textual and material culture for trade was not really 
market-oriented, and any manifestation of money was more ceremonial 
and symbolic rather than utilitarian. this insistence brought some major 
criticism to polanyi, which will be examined later. For now, suffice it to 
say, that polanyi was forced into some difficult interpretations in order to 
maintain his marketless stance of Mesopotamia. For example, he trans-
lates tamkāru as a resident alien (rather than the more acceptable trans-
lation, “trader”), without the social network of a native, thus inclined to 
resort to anomalous economic behavior.91 polanyi continued to soften his 
stance on markets throughout his career. as Johannes renger first noted, 
one wonders about the authorial legitimacy of his final work, The Liveli-
hood of Man, published posthumously in 1977, a full thirteen years after 
his death.92 In this work, he appeared to begin to accept the presence 
of supply-and-demand in pre-“Great transformation” societies. Interest-
ingly, in the years between his death and the more moderate views finally 
expressed in The Livelihood of Man, the formalist school arose to point 
out many of the shortcomings and deficiencies of polanyi’s economic 
paradigm.
anticipating the protest of his anti-market analysis, during the 1950s 
and 1960s, polanyi and his anthropologist followers developed a set of con-
cepts to lay down his argumentation against classical political economy, 
91 Karl polanyi, “Marketless trading in hammurabi’s time,” in Trade and Markets in the 
Early Empires, eds. Karl polanyi, conrad M. arensberg and harry w. pearson (chicago: 
regnery, 1957), 12–26.
92 Johannes M. renger, “patterns of Non-Institutional and Non-commercial exchange 
in ancient Mesopotamia at the Beginning of the Second Millenium B.c.,” in Circulation 
of Goods in Non-Palatial Context in the Ancient Near East, ed. alfonso archi (rome: 1984), 
31–123.
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that is the concept of the dual meanings of “economic,” the substantivist 
and the formal.93 these two terms are mutually exclusive to one another. 
Substantivist emphasizes the interconnection of humans with their physi-
cal environment and social groups. In substantivist systems, interchange 
is natural and leads to satisfaction. these economies allocate goods and 
services primarily through reciprocal exchange and redistribution. cer-
tain acephalous societies may not even have basic levels of redistribu-
tion, but exclusively use reciprocity for exchange. Substantivist economies 
also could have marketplaces, but these were not price-setting markets. 
rather, these marketplaces have prearranged exchange agreements based 
on fixed cultural expectations. Money also could be misleading, and here 
the influence of the trobriand Island community is spectacularly appar-
ent. Just because the island community uses bundles for exchange, it does 
not signal a market economy. rather, the bundles have no universal stan-
dard value, but served as special purpose money useable only within dis-
tinct kinship relations. In short, the presence of neither marketplace nor 
money does not necessarily equate to a capitalist market economy.
In contrast, formalist economy highlights the logical nature of mate-
rial goals. this formalist nature does not derive from needs and wants, 
but rather from insufficiency of covering these needs and wants. polanyi 
argued that formalist study of economies does not work for socially-
embedded, or substantivist systems. this type of study only applies to 
price-setting market economies. these capitalist economies typically 
maintain all three mechanisms of exchange, though the commodity of 
money, and its accumulation tends to drive the major processes. this 
bifurcation between substantivist and formalist economic classification 
made the philosophical basis of polanyi’s thought very apparent.94 Most 
significantly, the dichotomous nature of economic systems set the stage 
for major attacks on the substantivist approach.
93 “the simple recognition from which all such attempts must start is the fact that in 
referring to human activities the term economic is a compound of two meanings that have 
independent roots. we will call them the substantive and the formal meaning,” polanyi, 
“the economy as Instituted process,” 243.
94 Such an anti-positivisit philosophical assumption is not suprising considering the 
influence from his younger brother, Michael polanyi. See Lewis e. hill and eleanor t. von 
ende, “towards a personal Knowledge of economic history: reflections on our Intellec-
tual heritage from the polanyi Brothers,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 53 
(1994): 17–26.
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2.4.a. Economic Anthropology
two years after polanyi’s death, Scott cook’s publication of “the obso-
lete ‘anti-Market’ Mentality: a critique of the Substantivist approach to 
economic anthropology,” marks the official beginning of the formalist 
school’s response to polanyi’s substantivism.95 the formalists argue that 
microeconomic models are universal, and thus applicable to all societies, 
even those classified as socially-embedded. people can behave in simi-
lar enough ways to warrant the development of cross-cultural theoretical 
constructs. these formalist constructs assume the key concept of maximi-
zation in that all peoples wanted to maximize something, including non-
economic commodities such as the quality of marriage partner or levels 
of prestige. Both of these items are non-traditional commodities, yet they 
are both bound by the rule of scarcity. thus, only one tribal leader can 
have the most prestige and only one marriage partner can bring the maxi-
mum benefit to an extended family. this expansion of maximilization to 
non-monetary goods was already recognized for some time, though cook 
first used it within the context of the emerging formalist-substantivist 
debate.96 
cook suggested that substantivist economic models may have merit 
for studies in primitive societies, but that economic anthropology did not 
care about these systems. cook argued that these economies were rapidly 
disappearing due to the continuous invasion of market forces in these 
previously isolated states. thus, future economic anthropology needed 
to concern itself with such development of these market economies. 
95 of course, the intial publication of The Great Transformation immediately spawned 
criticism from both theoretical and historical perspectives during the life of polanyi, but a 
more or less unified response under the name of “formalism” began with Scott cook, “the 
‘anti-Market’ Mentality re-examined: a Further critique of the Substantivist approach 
to economic anthropology,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 25 (1969): 378–406; 
cook, “the obsolete ‘anti-Market’ Mentality: a critique of the Substantivist approach 
to economic anthropology,” American Anthropologist 68 (1966): 323–345. other formalist 
responses to polanyi include cook, “the ‘anti-Market’ Mentality re-examined: a Further 
critique of the Substantivist approach to economic anthropology,” Southwestern Journal 
of Anthropology 25 (1969): 378–406; cook, “Maximization, economic theory, and anthro-
pology: a reply to cancian,” American Anthropologist 68 (1966b): 1494–1498; edward e. 
Leclair, Jr., harold K. Schneider, Economic Anthropology: Readings in Theory and Analysis 
(New York: holt, rinehart & co., 1968); harold K. Schneider, Economic Man (New York: 
Free press, 1974).
96 “It does not affect the formal theory . . . in the least whether the individual maximizes 
wealth, religious piety, the annihilation of crooners or his waistline,” George Stigler, The 
Theory of Price (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 63–64.
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Interestingly, George Dalton, the symbolic leader of the polanyi group after 
his death in 1964, acknowledged the use of substantivism as exclusively 
useful for archaic stateless societies.97 this was particularly surprising as 
polanyi always intended to create an economic paradigm with universal 
applicability.
Most significantly, the formalists argue on the philosophical unresolv-
ability of the debate. cook himself disparagingly wrote of the substantivists:
the Formalists . . . focus on abstractions unlimited by time and place . . .; they 
are scientific in outlook and mathematical in inclination, favor the deductive 
mode of inquiry, and are basically analytical in methodology . . . the roman-
ticists focus on situations limited in time and space . . . they are humanistic 
in outlook and nonmathematical in inclination, favor the inductive mode of 
inquiry, and are basically synthetic in methodology.98
although this statement appears quite out of place in today’s postmodern 
academic climate, it nonetheless signals the epistemological differences 
between the formalists and substantivists. Several scholars point out the 
dichotomies of the debate ran along common divisive issues in social sci-
ences. thomas campbell lists five such divisions as reflected in the formal-
ist-substantivist debate: (1) idealist-materialist; (2) descriptive-normative; 
(3) individualistic-holistic; (4) conflict-consensus; and (5) positivist- 
interpretative.99 these tensions are not resolvable as they reveal funda-
mental philosophical differences in the formalist-substantivist discussion. 
the application to the ancient Near east goes back to question of 
97 “I think it is true polanyi’s theory is appropriate for an analysis of only three of what I 
regard as the five types of economy and historical time periods that comprise the subject: 
aboriginal economies in stateless societies; aboriginal economies in tribal kingdoms; and 
early traditional, pre-modern sub-sets of peasantries in states. the theory presented in 
Trade and Markets cannot analyze the bands, tribes, or peasantries studied by anthropolo-
gists as they changed under colonial rule or as they are presently changing in post-colonial 
development.” George Dalton, “writings that clarify theoretical Disputes over Karl 
polanyi’s work,” in The Life and Work of Karl Polanyi, ed. Kari polanyi-Levitt (Montreal: 
Black rose Books, 1990), 166–167. Interestingly, Dalton made these remarks before Karl 
polanyi’s daugher, Kari polanyi-Levitt during a conference honoring his intellectual legacy. 
Yet by doing so, he confirmed the antiquated nature of polanyian exchange in modern 
economic anthropology.
98 cook, “the obsolete ‘anti-Market’ Mentality,” 327. 
99 tom campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (oxford: oxford University press, 
1981); elman Service recognizes eight tensions in anthropology; Service, “the Bifurcation 
of Method and theory in ethnology,” in Themes in Ethnology and Culture History: Essays 
in Honor of David F. Aberle, ed. Leland Donald (Meerut, India: Folklore Institute, archana 
publications, 1987). Barry Isaac recognizes similar polarities in economics between institu-
tionalists and conventional microeconomists. Barry L. Isaac, “Karl polanyi,” in A Handbook 
of Economic Anthropology, 20.
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applicability of any social scientific theory to ancient societies. any uni-
versally-accepted economic framework of the entire ancient Near east is 
impossible. accordingly, today’s scholars of the ancient economy must 
command fluency of their own assumptions as well as the assumptions of 
their dialogue partners.100 
cook’s article unleashed a torrent of formalist positions further attack-
ing the substantivist theories.101 whereas substantivist theory dominated 
the academy during the 1960s and 1970s when anthropology was both 
cross-temporal and cross-cultural, the formalist barrage took its toll, 
and the 1980s saw the re-emergence of the formalist school in economic 
anthropology. Significantly, Stuart plattner’s widely-used textbook Eco-
nomic Anthropology devotes merely three pages to polanyi.102 Dalton’s 
statements certainly helped drive the demise, as well as some of the over-
zealousness of polanyi’s anti-market mentality. For ancient Near eastern 
studies, assyriology played a major role in further dismantling, then refor-
mulating the substantivist view of the ancient Near east.
2.4.b. Assyriology
whereas the formalist scholars attack the theoretical foundations of sub-
stativism, assyriologists critique the philology behind polanyi’s empiri-
cal evidence from Mesopotamia. the assyriological response to polanyi 
primarily came at the direction of his regrettable article, “Marketless 
trading in hammurabi’s time,” an easy target in that polanyi revealed 
a limited sophistication of philological and historical matters.103 In this 
article, polanyi insisted on the lack of markets based several question-
able strands of evidence. First, herodotus said that the persians had no 
Greek “marketplaces” (ἀγορά), and that the period of old Babylonia was 
essentially analogous with the persian period. Second, neither textual nor 
100 Much of the formalist-substantivist debate actually goes much further back then 
polanyi. the late nineteenth century saw two related debates within european scholar-
ship. one revolved over the concept of a hegelian development to an economic system 
with ancient systems being the most primitive. Karl Bücher symbolically represented the 
primativist view, and they were countered by the modernists (eduard Meyer) who believed 
that ancient Greek and modern German economic systems were essentially equivalent in 
that they were both driven by capitalist motivations. Not surprisingly, polanyi only quoted 
from the former. Karl Bücher, Die Enstehung Der Volkswirtschaft (tübingen: h. Lauppsche 
Buchhandlung, 1906); eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften (halle: Niemeyer, 1924).
101 Leclair, Economic Anthropology: Readings in Theory and Analysis; Schneider, Eco-
nomic Man; cook, “Maximization, economic theory, and anthropology.”
102 Stuart plattner, Economic Anthropology (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1989).
103 polanyi, “Marketless trading in hammurabi’s time.”
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archaeological data reveals any evidence for markets. third, polanyi tried 
to refute the use of old assyrian caravan traders for the proof of long dis-
tance market exchange, categorizing this activity as administered trade. 
thus, he saw traders as state agents, traveling these enormous distances 
from assur to anatolia under the protection of the assyrian state and the 
directive to deliver textiles and return with copper. thus, these traders 
did not face financial risks, and they were not in position to negotiate 
prices.
ancient Near eastern scholars, particularly assyriologists, quickly dis-
credited polanyi’s alleged empirical evidence. concerning the textual evi-
dence, herodotus implicitly was more likely stating that the persians did 
not cheat in comparison to the Greeks.104 Because both ethnographic and 
philological evidence suggests that the markets were open-air settings 
often by the city gate, material culture does not easily reveal remains of 
physical markets. wolfgang röllig showed that akkadian indeed had sev-
eral terms for a market.105 Most significantly, assyriologists quickly dem-
onstrated the shortcomings of polanyi’s interpretation of the anatolian 
caravan trade.106 In many instances, these old assyrian acted independent 
of the state. Financial losses were common and in fact, the texts often 
show that agents worried about such losses. assur did not import cop-
per, but only silver and gold, exclusively for the purpose of accumulating 
wealth.107
other assyriologists attacked the substantivist view from different 
chronological periods. alice Slotsky and peter temin both use Neo- 
Babylonian archives to show market forces at work, the former through 
philology and the latter through statistical analyses of astronomical texts 
that record commodity prices.108 Daniel Snell cautiously suggests the pres-
ence of private dealings within a small, yet well-integrated corpus of Ur III 
104 Daniel c. Snell, Life in the Ancient Near East (New haven and London: Yale University 
press, 1997), 149–150.
105 wolfgang röllig, “Der altmesopotamische Markt,” WdO 8 (1976): 286–295.
106 Klaas r. Veenhof, Aspects of the Old Assyrian Trade and Its Terminology (Leiden: Brill, 
1972); Veenhof, “Some Social effects of the old assyrian trade,” Iraq 39 (1977): 109–118.
107 John Gledhill and Morgens Larsen, “the polanyi paradigm and a Dynamic analysis of 
archaic States,” in Theory and Explanation in Archaeology: The Southhampton Conference, 
eds. colin and M.J. rowlands renfew, B.a. Segraves (New York: academic press, 1982), 
197–229.
108 alice Louise Slotsky, The Bourse of Babylon: Market Quotations in the Astronomical 
Diaries of Babylon (Bethesda: cDL press, 1997); peter temin, Price Behaviour in Ancient 
Babylon (tel aviv: research center on Jewish Law and economics, 2002).
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silver accounts.109 even Leo oppenheim began to distance himself from 
pure substantivism. In his 1970 paper on Mesopotamian trade, he omitted 
any reference to his own contribution to polanyi’s 1957 edited volume.110
Undoubtedly, all of these formalist arguments have merit as the textual 
data makes the existence of some measure of supply-and-demand irrefut-
able. to polanyi’s defense, he made such extreme claims when a modern-
ist perspective dominated study of the ancient world. although polanyi 
tried to confront these anachronistic perceptions a bit overzealously, the 
assyriologists refuted the substantivist assertions with commensurate 
vigor. More recently, assyriologists continue to accept the fundamental 
tenets of polanyi within a more moderate assessment of the formalist-
substantivist discussion. renger and robert englund independently argue 
that market forces, whereas undeniably present in the ancient Near east, 
played a subsidiary role to more socially-embedded exchange processes.111 
other assyriologists may be a bit more generous to the display of supply-
and-demand, yet still emphasize the social nature of trade.112
2.4.c. The Informal Economy
In the 1970s, a new branch of economic anthropology arose in the spirit 
of polanyi’s substativism. this subdiscipline, known as informal economy, 
109 Daniel c. Snell, Ledgers and Prices: Early Mesopotamian Merchant Accounts (New 
haven and London: Yale University press, 1982); Snell, “Marketless trading in our time,” 
JESHO 34 (1991): 129–141.
110 a. Leo oppenheim, “trade in the ancient Near east,” in Vth International Congress of 
Economic History (Mocow: Nauka, 1970), 1–37.
111 In particular, see Johannes renger, “patterns of Non-Institutional and Non- 
commercial exchange,”; renger, “Zu den altbabylonischen archives aus Sippar,” in 
Cuneiform Archives and Libraries, ed. Klaas r. Veenhof (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 96–15; also cf. 
renger, “on economic Structures in ancient Mesopotamia,” Orientalia 63 (1994): 157–208; 
renger, “probleme und perspektive einer wirtschaftsgeschichte Mesopotamiens,” Saecu-
lum, Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte 40 (1989): 166–178; robert K. englund, “hard work—
where will It Get You? Labor Management in Ur III Mesopotamia,” JESHO 50 (1991): 
255–280; englund, Organisation Und Verwaltung Der Ur III—Fischerei (Berlin: reimer, 1990). 
renger remains the most staunch post-polanyi substantivist. In confronting the old assyr-
ian evidence, he concedes to the obvious profit motives in some of the texts, but declares 
that this was a particularly exceptional case; renger, “on economic Structures,” 164, n. 12.
112 anne Goddeeris, Economy and Society in Northern Babylonia in the Early Old Babylo-
nian Period (ca. 2000–1800 BC) (Leuven: peeters, 2002); Marc van de Mieroop, Cuneiform 
Texts and the Writing of History (London: routledge, 1999); van de Mieroop, Society and 
Enterprise in Old Babylonian Ur (Berlin: raimer, 1992); Marvin powell, “wir Müssen unsere 
Nische Nutzen: Monies, Motives, and Methods in Babylonian economics,” in Trade and 
Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia, ed. Jan Gerrit Dercksen (Leiden-Istanbuk: 1999), 5–24; 
Norman Yoffee, Explaining Trade in Ancient Western Asia (Malibu: Undena, 1981); Yoffee, 
The Economic Role of the Crown in the Old Babylonian Period (Malibu: Urdena, 1977).
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focused on economic activity as “those activities that capture resources by 
(1) increasing private access to community resources beyond the norma-
tive allocation; and (2) partially or totally evading public monitoring or 
entry into the general accounts as well as any obligatory or reciprocal cor-
porate assessment (that is, tax).”113 although the informal sector certainly 
existed as long as economies existed, its emergence as a subject of study 
only occurred in the 1970s out of two main factors. First, the interest in 
economic development in two-thirds world countries revealed the exis-
tence of two interrelated spheres, the formal and the informal economy.114 
Second, studies on the socialist state showed that illicit processes could 
overrun the most rigidly controlled economic systems.115 the informal 
economy presumes that many measurable parameters of activity are 
undetectable through conventional means.
the difficulties in measuring the informal economy in modern times 
suggest that detecting such activity in ancient times is virtually impossible. 
Yet the informal economy can present a helpful theoretical construct for 
this present study. the informal economy often represents an enormous 
sector of the overall economic system. the more the social matrix fails 
to adequately provide satisfaction, the more illicit mechanisms develop 
within the very same system. these activities often involve those disen-
franchised from the economic protection of the official social system. Most 
importantly, acknowledging the existence of the informal economy forces 
one to think of its potential manifestations. If esarhaddon collected tolls 
along the arabian spice route in return for safe passage, then one must 
presume a sector of banditry and smuggling that simultaneously existed 
in Iron age IIB. If Solomon’s forced labor was overly oppressive, then one 
needs to consider the existence of measures such as bribes to avoid these 
duties. Despite the lack of available evidence, such questioning adds to 
our comprehensive picture of ancient economies. the informal economy 
provides a suitable model for contextualizaing some of the non-elite reci-
procity in chapter three.
113 M. estellie Smith, “the Informal economy,” in Economic Anthropology, ed. Stuart 
plattner (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1989): 292–317.
114 Keith hart, “Informal Income opportunities and Urban Development in Ghana,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 11 (1973): 61–89.
115 Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (cambridge: harvard University 
press, 1957); Dieter cassel and Ulrich cichy, “explaining the Growing Shadow economy 
in east and west: a comparative Systems approach,” Comparative Economic Studies 28 
(1968): 34–47.
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2.4.d. Biblical Studies
recently, biblical studies have borrowed from polanyi’s paradigm to 
reconstruct the social world of the Bible. particularly in the hebrew Bible, 
scholars have embraced the polanyian notion of reciprocity in relation to 
power displays and categories of honor and shame. reciprocity also allows 
for western scholars to make better sense of some of the cryptic giving 
patterns in hebrew Bible narratives. thus, Victor Matthews explains the 
reciprocal exchange between Jacob and esau, longtime enemies, as a liter-
ary device to portray social tension.116 Gary Stansell examines the power 
of reciprocity to shift social relations in several passages of the Dtrh.117 
Menahem herman departs from the traditional view of tithe as a tax, and 
interprets it more in line of partnership and covenant with God under 
the principles of reciprocity.118 Interestingly, all three of the above studies 
make little or no explicit reference to polanyi, but rather rely on more 
developed reciprocal models of Mauss and Sahlins. this does not neces-
sarily reflect the bibliographic deficiencies of these works, but more so the 
pervasive influence of polanyi in that the concept of reciprocity is now a 
stock term in the academy.
though polanyi has explanatory power for many social relations of 
the hebrew narratives, his contribution to studies on biblical economic 
structures remains minimal. ronald Simkins summarizes, “Biblical studies 
has virtually ignored the developments in economic anthropology.”119 In 
the only explicitly economic analysis of ancient Israel through a polany-
ian model, Simkins determines that monarchic inequalities maintained 
themselves through the mode of patronage. But by his own admission, 
Simkins ultimately relies more on Marx than on polanyi in tying the social 
structures to the crucial economic decisions of the day.120
116 Matthews also uses reciprocity in the meeting of Jeroboam and the “man of Judah” in 
1 Kings 13; Victor h. Matthews, “the Unwanted Gift: Implications of obligatory Gift Giving 
in ancient Israel,” Sem 68 (1999): 91–104.
117 Gary Stansell, “the Gift in ancient Israel,” Sem 87 (1999): 65–90.
118 Menahem herman, “tithe as Gift: the Biblical Institution in Light of Mauss’s “pres-
tationtheory”,” AJSR 18 (1993): 51–73.
119 ronald a. Simkins, “patronage and the political economy of Monarchic Israel,” Sem 
87 (1999), 125.
120 Simkins builds on the theories of rhoda halperin, who was the first to draw out 
specific attachment between the ideas of Marx and polanyi, a connection that many sub-
stantivists of the late 1970s and early 1980s vehemently denied; Simpkins, “patronage and 
the political economy,” 124. See also halperin, “polanyi, Marx, and the Institutional para-
digm in economic anthropology “ Research in Economic Anthropology 7 (1984): 339–368. 
Largely stimulated by Bruce Malina and the context Group, New testament scholars 
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2.5. Summary and Conclusions
this brief review of the intellectual history behind polanyi’s paradigm of 
exchange helps clarify his own positions. Like any social theory, polanyi 
had a voice within a longstanding dialogue concerning political economy, 
spanning Smith, Marx, weber and Malinowski. By clarifying the intel-
lectual context, the paradigms of reciprocity, redistribution and mar-
ket exchange emerge more clearly. the portrayals of exchange in 1 and 
2 Kings are now more readily identifiable.
although polanyi did not meet his initial objective to influence modern 
economic policy in european states, he serendipitously had an enormous 
impact throughout the humanities.121 aside from the threefold categories 
of exchange in reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange, polanyi’s 
work opened wide conversations in ancient Near eastern and classical 
studies regarding the nature of economies. over a generation after the 
publication of The Great Transformation, the substantivist—formalist 
debate has emerged from bifurcation to a much more moderate dis-
cussion. rarely does any ancient Near eastern scholar advocate a com-
pletely substantivist or a completely formalist view of economic society.122 
utilize polanyian reciprocity as an attractive tool to unpack the social nature of the 
gospels; Malina, The New Testament World: Insignts from Cultural Anthropology, 3rd ed. 
(Louisville: westminster John Knox, 2001); also see Zeba a. crook, “reciprocity—cove-
nantal exchange as a test case,” in Ancient Israel: The Old Testament in Its Social Con-
text, ed. philip esler (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 78–91; crook, “reflections on culture 
and Social-Scientific Models,” JBL 124 (2005): 515–532; alan Kirk, “Karl polanyi, Marshall 
Sahlins, and the Study of ancient Social relations,” JBL 126 (2007): 182–191; Kirk, “ ‘Love 
Your enemies,’ the Golden rule, and ancient reciprocity (Luke 6:27–35)” JBL 122 (2003): 
667–686; Douglas e. oakman, “Money in the Moral Universe of the New testament,” in 
The Social Settings of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. wolfgang w. Stegemann (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2002), 335–348.
121 Significantly, polanyi has also had tremendous influence on two closely related fields, 
classics and egyptology. In the classics, polanyi’s understanding of socially-embedded 
economies found its way to Moses Finley, which has in turn catalyzed a renewal of the 
formalist-substantivist debate in the classical world; Finley, The Ancient Economy. polanyi 
has made a large impact on egyptology, via Janssen’s seminal publication of in which 
he emphasizes the social order of the New Kingdom. In evaluating textual evidence at 
Deir el-Medineh, he determines that reciprocity and not market exchange is the primary 
mechanism for the economic structure of New Kingdom egypt. J.J. Janssen, “prolegomena 
to the Study of egypt’s economic history During the New Kingdom,” Studien zur Altägyp-
tischen Kultur 3 (1975): 127–185; also see edward Bleiberg, “the economy of ancient egypt,” 
in CANE, 1375. recently, polanyian interpretation of ancient egypt has met challenge. See 
warburton, State and Economy in Ancient Egypt, Barry Kemp, Ancient Egypt.
122 “It must be stressed that it is a question of the relative proportion of reciprocity, 
redistribution, and market exchange, and not their simple presence or absence.” Schloen, 
The House of the Father, 81.
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consequently, this study does not seek to disprove the existence of any 
of these mechanisms, but rather to analyze them as viable categories in 
the study of the economic structures in 1 and 2 Kings. In embarking on 
this task, the prescient statement of Max weber, from one hundred years 
ago appears more applicable than ever: “what has been sketched above 
indicates that somewhat complex economic institutions existed, but it is 
not now possible for us to judge the relative importance of these phenom-
ena for the economic structure of Mesopotamia.”123 the last century of 
research has only confirmed the complexity of economies in the ancient 
Near east. with this task in mind, we can now turn to the biblical texts 
for its voice on this matter.
123 weber, The Agrarian Society of Ancient Civilizations, 103.
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